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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
At issue is whether the First Amendment precludes 
imposition of civil damages for the disclosure of portions of 
a tape recording of an intercepted telephone conversation 
containing information of public significance when the 
defendants, two radio stations, their reporter, and the 
individual who furnished the tape recording, played no 
direct or indirect role in the interception. 
 
I. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
A. 
 
From the beginning of 1992 until the beginning of 1994, 
Wyoming Valley West School District was in contract 
negotiations with the Wyoming Valley West School District 
Teachers' Union (the "Teachers' Union") over the terms of 
the teachers' new contract. The negotiations, which were 
markedly contentious, generated significant public interest 
and were frequently covered by the news media. 
 
Plaintiffs Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony F. Kane, Jr., as 
well as defendant Jack Yocum, all were heavily involved in 
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the negotiating process. Bartnicki was the chief negotiator 
on behalf of the Teachers' Union. Kane, a teacher at 
Wyoming Valley West High School, served as president of 
the local union. Yocum served as president of the Wyoming 
Valley West Taxpayers' Association, an organization formed 
by local citizens for the sole purpose of opposing the 
Teachers' Union's proposals. 
 
In May of 1993, Bartnicki, using her cellular phone, had 
a conversation with Kane. They discussed whether the 
teachers would obtain a three-percent raise, as suggested 
by the Wyoming Valley West School Board, or a six-percent 
raise, as suggested by the Teachers' Union. In the course of 
their phone conversation, Kane stated: 
 
       If they're not going to move for three percent, we're 
       gonna have to go to their, their homes . . . to blow off 
       their front porches, we'll have to do some work on 
       some of those guys . . . . Really, uh, really and 
       truthfully, because this is, you know, this is bad news 
       (undecipherable) The part that bothers me, they could 
       still have kept to their three percent, but they're again 
       negotiating in the paper. This newspaper report knew 
       it was three percent. What they should have said,`we'll 
       meet and discuss this.' You don't discuss the items in 
       public. 
 
App. at 35-36. Bartnicki responded, "No," and, Kane 
continued, "You don't discuss this in public . . . . 
Particularly with the press." App. at 36. 
 
This conversation, including the statements quoted 
above, was intercepted and recorded by an unknown 
person, and the tape left in Yocum's mailbox. Yocum 
retrieved the tape, listened to it, and recognized the voices 
of Bartnicki and Kane. He then gave a copy of the tape to 
Fred Williams, also known as Frederick W. Vopper, of WILK 
Radio and Rob Neyhard of WARM Radio, both local radio 
stations. Williams repeatedly played part of the tape on the 
air as part of the Fred Williams Show, a radio news/public 
affairs talk show which is broadcast simultaneously over 
WILK Radio and WGBI-AM. The tape was also aired on 
some local television stations and written transcripts were 
published in some newspapers. 
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B. 
 
Bartnicki and Kane sued Yocum, Williams, WILK Radio, 
and WGBI Radio (hereafter "media defendants") under both 
federal and state law. They based their federal claims on 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968, as amended by the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986, 28 U.S.C. S 2510 et seq., and their 
state claims on the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and 
Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 5701 et seq. As relief, Bartnicki and Kane sought (1) 
actual damages in excess of $50,000, (2) statutory damages 
under 18 U.S.C. S 2520(c)(2), (3) liquidated damages under 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 5725(a)(1), (4) punitive damages, and 
(5) attorneys' fees and costs. 
 
Bartnicki, Kane, and the defendants each moved for 
summary judgment. The District Court denied these 
motions on June 14, 1996 and denied defendants' motion 
to reconsider on November 8, 1996, specifically holding that 
imposing liability on the defendants would not violate the 
First Amendment. 
 
The District Court subsequently certified two questions 
as controlling questions of law: "(1) whether the imposition 
of liability on the media Defendants under the [wiretapping 
statutes] solely for broadcasting the newsworthy tape on 
the Defendant Fred Williams' radio news/public affairs 
program, when the tape was illegally intercepted and 
recorded by unknown persons who were not agents of the 
Defendants, violates the First Amendment; and (2) whether 
imposition of liability under the aforesaid [wiretapping 
statutes] on Defendant Jack Yocum solely for providing the 
anonymously intercepted and recorded tape to the media 
Defendants violates the First Amendment." App. at 388. 
Williams, WILK Radio, and WGBI Radio subsequently 
petitioned for permission to appeal. Yocum filed an answer 
to the petition in which he joined the media defendants' 
request that we hear this appeal. We granted the petition 
by order dated February 26, 1998. The Pennsylvania State 
Education Association submitted a brief as amicus curiae in 
support of the appellees, and the United States has 
intervened as of right pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2403. 
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C. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction to consider claims 
based on the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. It had supplemental 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367 to consider 
claims based on the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and 
Electronic Surveillance Control Act. We have appellate 
jurisdiction to review the District Court's substantive 
determination pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b). 
 
The scope of our review in a permitted interlocutory 
appeal is limited to questions of law raised by the 
underlying order. We are not limited to answering the 
questions certified, however, and may address any issue 
necessary to decide the appeal. See Dailey v. National 
Hockey League, 987 F.2d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary 
judgment de novo. See H.K. Porter Co. v. Pennsylvania Ins. 
Guaranty Ass'n, 75 F.3d 137, 140 (3d Cir. 1996). We are 
"required to apply the same test the district court should 
have utilized initially," to view inferences to be drawn from 
the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, and to take the non-movant's 
allegations as true whenever these allegations conflict with 
those of the movant. Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 
F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 
D. 
 
The Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968 (the "Federal Wiretapping Act") provides in relevant 
part: 
 
       (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in  this 
       chapter any person who -- 
 
        . . . 
 
       (c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to discl ose, 
       to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or 
       electronic communication, knowing or having reason 
       to know that the information was obtained through 
       the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic 
       communication in violation of this subsection; 
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       (d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the 
       contents of any wire, oral, or electronic 
       communication, knowing or having reason to know 
       that the information was obtained through the 
       interception of a wire, oral, or electronic 
       communication in violation of this subsection . . . 
 
       shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall 
       be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5). 
 
18 U.S.C. S 2511. It continues: 
 
       (a) In general. -- Except as provided in section 
       2511(2)(a)(ii), any person whose wire, oral, or electronic 
       communication is intercepted, disclosed, or 
       intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a 
       civil action recover from the person or entity which 
       engaged in the violation such relief as may be 
       appropriate. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 2520. The Federal Wiretapping Act thus creates 
civil and criminal causes of action against those who 
intentionally use or disclose to another the contents of a 
wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having 
reason to know that the information was obtained in 
violation of the statute. 
 
The Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic 
Surveillance Control Act (the "Pennsylvania Wiretapping 
Act") is similar. It provides: 
 
       Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a person 
       is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he: 
 
        . . . 
 
        (2) intentionally discloses or endeavors to di sclose to 
       any other person the contents of any wire, electronic or 
       oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, 
       knowing or having reason to know that the information 
       was obtained through the interception of a wire, 
       electronic or oral communication; or 
 
        (3) intentionally uses or endeavors to use the 
       contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, 
       or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having 
       reason to know that the information was obtained 
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       through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral 
       communication. 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 5703. It further provides: 
 
       (a) Cause of action. -- Any person whose wire, 
       electronic or oral communication is intercepted, 
       disclosed or used in violation of this chapter shall have 
       a civil cause of action against any person who 
       intercepts, discloses or uses or procures any other 
       person to intercept, disclose or use, such 
       communication . . . . 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 5725. The Pennsylvania Wiretapping 
Act thus also creates civil and criminal causes of action 
based on the knowing or negligent use or disclosure of 
illegally intercepted material. We refer to the federal and 
state statutes at issue here as "The Wiretapping Acts." 
 
Both Acts also explicitly authorize the recovery of civil 
relief. The Federal Wiretapping Act provides that a court 
may "assess as damages whichever is the greater of -- 
 
        (A) the sum of the actual damages suffered by the 
       plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a 
       result of the violation; or 
 
        (B) statutory damages of whichever is the grea ter of 
       $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000." 
 
18 U.S.C. S 2520(c)(2). The Pennsylvania Wiretapping Act 
specifies that a successful plaintiff "shall be entitled to 
recover from any such person: 
 
       (1) Actual damages, but not less than liquidated 
       damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each 
       day of violation, or $1,000, whichever is higher. 
 
       (2) Punitive damages. 
 
       (3) A reasonable attorney's fee and other litigati on 
       costs reasonably incurred." 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 5725(a). 
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II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
 
As the District Court acknowledged and the parties do 
not dispute, the media defendants neither intercepted nor 
taped the conversation between Bartnicki and Kane. 
Indeed, the record does not disclose how or by whom the 
conversation was intercepted. The media defendants argued 
before the District Court that these facts preclude a court 
from finding them liable under the Wiretapping Acts. The 
District Court disagreed. It concluded that, "a violation of 
these acts can occur by the mere finding that a defendant 
had a reason to believe that the communication that he 
disclosed or used was obtained through the use of an illegal 
interception." Bartnicki v. Vopper, No. 94-1201, slip op. at 
5 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 1996). It further opined that such an 
interpretation of the statute "adheres to the purpose of the 
act which was to protect wire and oral communications and 
an individual's privacy interest in such." Id. The District 
Court concluded that genuine disputes of material fact 
remain regarding (1) whether the Bartnicki-Kane 
conversation was illegally intercepted, and if so (2) whether 
any or all of the defendants knew or had reason to know 
that that conversation was illegally intercepted. See id. at 5, 
10. The parties do not challenge these holdings on appeal. 
 
Hence, this case does not involve the prohibitions of the 
Wiretapping Acts against the actual interception of wire 
communications. Nor does it involve any application of the 
Acts' criminal provisions. Rather, this case focuses 
exclusively on the portions of the Wiretapping Acts that 
create causes of action for civil damages against those who 
use or disclose intercepted communications and who had 
reason to know that the information was received through 
an illegal interception. 
 
The defendants argue that applying the damages 
provision of the Wiretapping Acts to hold them liable for 
disclosing the Bartnicki-Kane conversation violates the 
First Amendment. They contend that this case is controlled 
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by the Supreme Court's decisions in a series of cases 
addressing the tension between the First Amendment and 
the right to privacy. 
 
In the first of these cases, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the Court considered a private 
right of action created by a Georgia statute making it a 
"misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the name or identity 
of a rape victim." Id. at 472. The Court was asked to decide 
whether Georgia could impose civil liability on a television 
broadcasting company, among others, for accurately 
broadcasting the name of a deceased, 17-year-old rape 
victim where the reporter obtained the information from 
official court records open to public inspection. 
 
In the next case, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), the Court reviewed a Virginia 
statute that both provided for the confidentiality of judicial 
disciplinary proceedings and made it unlawful to divulge 
the identity of a judge subject to such proceedings prior to 
the filing of a formal complaint with the state's highest 
court. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether 
Virginia could criminally prosecute a newspaper for 
publishing accurate information about such proceedings 
where the newspaper received the information from a 
participant in the proceedings who had the right to receive 
the information but not the right to divulge it. See id. at 
830. 
 
Finally, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 
(1979), the Court considered a West Virginia statute 
"making it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without the 
written approval of the juvenile court, the name of any 
youth charged as a juvenile offender." Id. at 98. The Court 
was asked to decide whether West Virginia could prosecute 
two newspapers for publishing the name of a 14-year-old 
student who was accused of shooting and killing a 15-year- 
old classmate at the local junior high school. The 
newspapers had obtained the student's name by 
interviewing witnesses at the school. 
 
The Supreme Court concluded that each of these 
attempts to punish or deter the press's publication of 
truthful information was unconstitutional. The Smith Court, 
 
                                10 
  
in summarizing the Court's past cases, read them as 
suggesting at least two propositions: (1) "state action to 
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can 
satisfy constitutional standards," and (2) "if a newspaper 
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of 
public significance then state officials may not 
constitutionally punish publication of the information, 
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest 
order." 491 U.S. at 102, 103; accord Florida Star v. B.J.F., 
491 U.S. 524, 533-37 (1989) (adopting and explaining the 
justification for the second Smith proposition). 
 
The defendants contend that the information disclosed 
about the Bartnicki-Kane conversation was lawfully 
obtained within the meaning of the Smith decision because 
the defendants in this case neither participated in the 
presumed interception nor violated any law by receiving the 
information. They conclude that the Wiretapping Acts may 
not be applied to hold them liable without first meeting the 
test of strict scrutiny. 
 
Bartnicki and Kane respond by arguing that the 
information at issue here was unlawfully obtained because 
the original interception presumably was illegal. They 
conclude that applying the Acts to hold the defendants 
liable is constitutional without subjecting those statutes to 
any level of First Amendment scrutiny. The parties thus 
assume that we should determine the constitutionality of 
the Wiretapping Acts by first determining whether the 
information disclosed was "lawfully" or "unlawfully" 
obtained. 
 
Although we are cognizant of the importance of the Cox, 
Landmark, and Smith cases as background, we decline to 
read Smith as controlling here. The Supreme Court has 
explicitly repudiated any suggestion that Smith answers the 
question whether a statute that limits the dissemination of 
information obtained by means of questionable legality is 
subject to First Amendment scrutiny. In Florida Star, the 
Court stated, "The [Smith] principle does not settle the issue 
whether, in cases where information has been acquired 
unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may 
ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the 
ensuing publication as well." 491 U.S. at 535 n.8. Similarly, 
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the Smith Court was careful to note that its holding did not 
reach the issue of unlawful press access. See 443 U.S. at 
105. 
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court's practice of narrowly 
circumscribing its holdings in this area strongly suggests 
that a rule for undecided cases should not be derived by 
negative implication from its reported decisions. The 
defendant in Landmark urged the Court to adopt a blanket 
rule, protecting the press from any liability for truthfully 
reporting information concerning public officials and their 
public duties, but the Supreme Court refused to do so. See 
435 U.S. at 838. Instead it considered the very narrow 
question: "whether [a state] may subject persons, including 
newspapers, to criminal sanctions for divulging information 
regarding proceedings before a state judicial commission 
which is authorized to hear complaints as to judges' 
disability or misconduct, when such proceedings are 
declared confidential by the State Constitution and 
statutes." Id. at 830. 
 
Similarly, the Florida Star Court refused"appellant's 
invitation to hold broadly that truthful publication may 
never be punished consistent with the First Amendment." 
491 U.S. at 532. It stated: "Our cases have carefully 
eschewed reaching this ultimate question, mindful that the 
future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels our 
not resolving anticipatorily. . . . We continue to believe that 
the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in 
clashes between First Amendment and privacy rights 
counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more 
broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case." 
Id. at 532-33. 
 
In keeping with the Supreme Court's approach to 
deciding these illustrative cases, we will resolve the present 
controversy not by mechanically applying a test gleaned 
from Cox and its progeny, but by reviewing First 
Amendment principles in light of the unique facts and 
circumstances of this case. 
 
B. 
 
The District Court based its conclusion that the damages 
provision of the Wiretapping Acts may constitutionally be 
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applied to penalize the defendants' conduct primarily on the 
Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 
501 U.S. 663 (1991). The District Court interpreted that 
decision as standing for the proposition that a generally 
applicable law that neither singles out the press for special 
burdens nor purposefully restricts free expression does not 
offend the First Amendment. See Bartnicki, slip op. at 8 
("Generally applicable laws `do not offend the First 
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the 
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and 
report the news.' " (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 
U.S. 663, 669 (1991))). The District Court emphasized 
language from the Cohen opinion in which the Supreme 
Court stated, " `[i]t is . . . beyond dispute that the publisher 
of a newspaper has no special immunity from the 
application of general laws. He has no special privilege to 
invade the rights and liberties of others.' " Bartnicki, slip op. 
at 8 (quoting Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670). 
 
After reviewing the Federal and Pennsylvania Wiretapping 
Acts, the District Court found that neither Act targets or 
singles out the press. The District Court also opined that 
these laws are not "specifically designed to chill free 
speech." Id. at 7. Based on this finding, it concluded that 
"both acts are matters of general applicability" and, without 
further analysis, denied defendants' motion for summary 
judgment on the basis of the First Amendment. 
 
There is reason to question whether the damages 
provisions of the Acts are properly categorized as generally 
applicable laws. Arguably, that term should be reserved for 
laws that directly regulate conduct rather than speech. See 
infra at 15. Moreover, it may well be that be that by 
banning the disclosure of certain information, the damages 
provisions impose a disproportionate burden on the press. 
Indeed, we would not be surprised to find that a prohibition 
on disclosure falls more heavily on the press, which is in 
the business of disseminating information, than it does on 
ordinary citizens whose opportunities for spreading 
information are more limited. 
 
We need not resolve that question, however, because we 
conclude that, by suggesting that generally applicable laws 
do not require First Amendment scrutiny when applied to 
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the press, the District Court read the cited portions of 
Cohen too broadly. In Cohen, the plaintiff, who was actively 
associated with the election staff of a gubernatorial 
candidate, offered to provide two newspapers with some 
information concerning the candidate's opponent in 
exchange for a promise that the newspapers would not use 
his name in any resulting story. After having made the 
promise and secured the information, each newspaper 
proceeded to publish a story identifying Cohen as the 
source of the information and highlighting his role in the 
gubernatorial campaign. Cohen lost his job the day the 
stories ran. He then sued the publishers of the newspapers 
in state court and recovered damages under a theory of 
promissory estoppel. The publishers appealed, arguing that 
holding them liable for their breached promises would 
violate the First Amendment. 
 
It is in the context of rejecting this argument that the 
Supreme Court stated, "[G]enerally applicable laws do not 
offend the First Amendment simply because their 
enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its 
ability to gather and report the news." Cohen , 501 U.S. at 
669. The Court explained that "enforcement of such general 
laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny 
than would be applied to enforcement against other 
persons or organizations." Id. at 670. 
 
The Cohen opinion thus instructs that a law of general 
applicability, which neither targets nor imposes 
disproportionate burdens upon the press, is enforceable 
against the press to the same extent that it is enforceable 
against individuals or organizations. The question remains 
whether the damages provisions of the Wiretapping Acts 
may constitutionally be applied to penalize individuals or 
organizations for disclosing material they know or have 
reason to know was illegally intercepted who had no part in 
the interception. 
 
C. 
 
In order to determine whether the provisions for civil 
sanctions from the Wiretapping Acts may constitutionally 
be applied to penalize defendants' disclosure, we must first 
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decide what degree of First Amendment scrutiny should be 
applied. 
 
The United States argues that the Federal Wiretapping 
Act is subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. It 
bases this contention on two subsidiary assertions: (1) that 
these are "general law[s] that impose[ ] only incidental 
burdens on expression" and (2) that "to the extent that Title 
III restricts speech in particular cases, it does so in an 
entirely content-neutral fashion." United States' Br. at 22. 
It states that "[a] statute satisfies intermediate scrutiny, if 
it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest, if the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression, and if the incidental 
restriction on speech is not unnecessarily great." United 
States' Br. at 11-12. We assume that the United States' 
arguments apply equally to the Pennsylvania Wiretapping 
Act, which is substantially similar to the Federal 
Wiretapping Act. 
 
We first consider the United States' argument that the 
disclosure provisions of the Wiretapping Acts merit only 
intermediate scrutiny because they impose only incidental 
burdens on expression. In support, the United States cites 
a series of Supreme Court decisions, beginning with United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 
O'Brien was arrested and convicted for burning his draft 
card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse. On 
appeal, O'Brien argued that the federal law, making it an 
offense to "forge[ ], alter[ ], knowingly destroy[ ], knowingly 
mutilate[ ], or in any manner change[ ] . . . such [a] 
certificate," was unconstitutional. Id. at 370 (italics 
omitted). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed 
that this provision unconstitutionally abridged the freedom 
of speech. 
 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed. It opined that the 
statute "on its face deals with conduct having no 
connection with speech. It prohibits the knowing 
destruction of certificates issued by the Selective Service 
System, and there is nothing necessarily expressive about 
such conduct." Id. at 375.1  The Supreme Court nonetheless 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Respected commentators have taken issue with this holding in 
O'Brien. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 
S 312-6 at 824-25 (2d ed. 1988). 
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recognized that O'Brien had burned his draft card as a form 
of protest against war. Assuming for the sake of argument 
that "the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's 
conduct [was] sufficient to bring into play the First 
Amendment," the Supreme Court held that the statute was 
still a permissible regulation. Id. at 376. It reasoned that 
"when `speech' and `nonspeech' elements are combined in 
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element 
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment 
freedoms." Id. The Court stated that such"a government 
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the 
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged 
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than essential to 
the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377. 
 
In O'Brien and its progeny, the Supreme Court 
distinguished between "expressive conduct protected to 
some extent by the First Amendment" and oral or written 
expression, which is fully protected by that amendment. 
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 
293 (1984). "[C]onduct that is intended to be 
communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be 
understood by the viewer to be communicative" is 
"[s]ymbolic expression," otherwise known as expressive 
conduct. Id. at 294. The cases the United States cites in 
addition to O'Brien also focus on the permissibility of 
regulating expressive conduct. See Barnes v. Glen Theater, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (Indiana statute prohibiting 
complete nudity in public places); Arcara v. Cloud Books, 
Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986) (New York statute authorizing 
closure of building found to be a public health nuisance); 
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985) (federal 
statute making it unlawful to reenter a military base after 
having been barred by the commanding officer); Clark, 468 
U.S. at 289 (National Park Service regulation prohibiting 
camping in Lafayette Park); cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377 (1992) (Minnesota statute prohibiting display of 
certain objects, including a burning cross or Nazi swastika). 
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By citing this line of cases in support of its position that 
intermediate scrutiny applies here, the United States 
apparently suggests that defendants' actions in disclosing 
the contents of the Bartnicki-Kane conversation are 
properly considered "expressive conduct" rather than 
speech. If this is the thrust of the government's citations, it 
is not persuasive. The acts on which Bartnicki and Kane 
base their complaint are Yocum's "intentionally disclos[ing 
a] tape to several individuals and media sources"2 and the 
media defendants' "intentionally disclos[ing] and 
publish[ing] to the public the entire contents of the private 
telephone conversation between Bartnicki and Kane." App. 
at 149. If the acts of "disclosing" and "publishing" 
information do not constitute speech, it is hard to imagine 
what does fall within that category, as distinct from the 
category of expressive conduct. 
 
We have no doubt that it is possible to identify some act 
by the media defendants in the course of preparing the 
broadcasts during which the tape was disclosed that falls 
within our ordinary understanding of the term conduct. 
However, this fact does not alter the analysis. The Supreme 
Court has observed, "It is possible to find some kernel of 
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes -- 
for example, walking down the street or meeting one's 
friends at a shopping mall -- but such kernel is not 
sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the 
First Amendment." Barnes, 501 U.S. at 570 (quoting Dallas 
v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)). Similarly, although it 
may be possible to find some kernel of conduct in almost 
every act of expression, such kernel of conduct does not 
take the defendants' speech activities outside the protection 
of the First Amendment. 
 
The United States nonetheless insists that intermediate 
scrutiny is appropriate because the statute, read as a 
whole, primarily prohibits conduct rather than speech. It 
notes that the prohibition in 18 U.S.C. S 2511(d) against 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The complaint also alleges that Yocum "obtained a tape of the 
surreptitiously recorded telephone conversation," App. at 149, but the 
complaint does not allege that the mere obtaining of the tape violates 
either statute. 
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using or endeavoring to use intercepted material 
encompasses more than disclosure. The government asserts 
that it precludes, for example, a person or company from 
using intercepted material to develop a competing product, 
to craft a negotiating strategy, or to justify taking 
disciplinary action against an employee. United States' Br. 
at 22-23. 
 
The government cites no support for the surprising 
proposition that a statute that governs both pure speech 
and conduct merits less First Amendment scrutiny than 
one that regulates speech alone. We are convinced that this 
proposition does not accurately state First Amendment law. 
A statute that prohibited the "use" of evolution theory 
would surely violate the First Amendment if applied to 
prohibit the disclosure of Charles Darwin's writings, much 
as a law that directly prohibited the publication of those 
writings would surely violate that Amendment. 
 
Because the defendants' acts in this case -- the 
disclosure and broadcast of information -- contain no 
significant "nonspeech" elements, we need not decide 
whether this statute could properly be subjected to lesser 
scrutiny if applied to prohibit "uses" that do involve such 
"nonspeech" elements. We merely hold that, when a statute 
that regulates both speech and conduct is applied to an act 
of pure speech, that statute must meet the same degree of 
First Amendment scrutiny as a statute that regulates 
speech alone. 
 
The United States' second argument -- that intermediate 
scrutiny applies because the Acts are content-neutral -- is 
more persuasive. 
 
When the state uses a "content-based" regulation to 
restrict free expression, particularly political speech, that 
regulation is subject to "the most exacting scrutiny." Boos 
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Phillips v. Borough of 
Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc). It will 
not be upheld unless the state can show that it"is 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Boos, 485 U.S. at 
321; see also Phillips, 107 F.3d at 172 ("State regulations of 
speech that are not regarded as content neutral will be 
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sustained only if they are shown to serve a compelling state 
interest in a manner which involves the least possible 
burden on expression."). 
 
By contrast, when the state places a reasonable"content- 
neutral" restriction on speech, such as a time, place and 
manner regulation, that regulation need not meet the same 
high degree of scrutiny. "Content-neutral" restrictions are 
valid under the First Amendment provided that they"are 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of information."3 
Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
 
We recognize that an argument could be made that the 
Wiretapping Acts are content-based. Ordinarily, the 
distinction between permissible and impermissible 
regulation of speech depends on whether the law at issue 
regulates the substantive content of the speech (what is 
said) or whether it merely regulates the time, place, or 
manner of the speech (when, where, at what volume, and 
through which medium it is said). The former regulations 
are content-based while the latter are content-neutral. The 
essence of the distinction lies in the fact that, if the 
regulation were content-based, it would not be possible to 
determine whether a particular speech is prohibited 
without referring to the substantive import of that 
expression. 
 
The United States contends that the Wiretapping Acts are 
not content-based even in the literal sense referred to above 
because the Acts define the content that is prohibited by 
reference to the manner in which the information was 
acquired, rather than to its subject matter or viewpoint. We 
suspect that the mere fact that a regulation defines the 
category of content that is prohibited by reference to its 
source rather than its subject matter is unlikely to be 
sufficient to justify treating the regulation as content- 
neutral. For example, one might argue that a ban on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This standard is little different from that announced in O'Brien as 
governing conduct regulations that incidentally restrict expressive 
behavior. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 298. 
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publication of information obtained through 
experimentation on human embryos would raise sufficient 
First Amendment concerns to merit heightened scrutiny, 
even if such experimentation were illegal. 
 
The Supreme Court's decision in Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1985), however, suggests that 
we are not limited to a literal interpretation of the phrase 
"content-neutral" but may determine whether speech is 
content-neutral or content-based with reference to the 
government's proffered justification for the restriction. In 
Renton, the Supreme Court described "content-neutral" 
speech restrictions as those that "are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech." Id. at 48 
(quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). We 
therefore turn to consider the purpose or purposes the 
Wiretapping Acts are meant to serve. 
 
The Senate Report describes the purposes of the Federal 
Wiretapping Act as: "(1) protecting the privacy of wire and 
oral communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform 
basis the circumstances and conditions under which the 
interception of wire and oral communications may be 
authorized." S. Rep. No. 90-1079 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153. Congress thus focused on privacy 
in adopting 18 U.S.C. S 2511, the provision that prohibits 
the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, 
as well as the use or disclosure of the contents of illegally 
intercepted communications. Congress did not, however, 
define the privacy interest that it intended the Act to 
protect. 
 
As commonly understood, the right to privacy 
encompasses both the right "to be free from unreasonable 
intrusions upon [one's] seclusion" and the right to be free 
from "unreasonable publicity concerning [one's] private life." 
Fultz v. Gilliam, 942 F.2d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); see also 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Paul P. v. Verniero, 
170 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1999). The Sixth Circuit has opined 
that "[t]he prohibitions Congress incorporated into section 
2511(1) of Title III protect both these interestsfirst, by 
prohibiting the surreptitious interception of private 
communications in the first instance -- a highly offensive 
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physical intrusion on the victim's private affairs-- and 
second, by circumscribing the dissemination of private 
information so obtained." Fultz, 942 F.2d at 401 (footnote 
omitted). The First Circuit has similarly suggested that by 
enacting Title III Congress recognized "that the invasion of 
privacy is not over when the interception occurs but is 
compounded by disclosure." Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 
602 F.2d 1010, 1013 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Fultz, 942 
F.2d at 402 ("Each time the illicitly obtained recording is 
replayed to a new and different listener, the scope of the 
invasion widens and the aggrieved party's injury is 
aggravated."). 
 
We have no doubt that the state has a significant interest 
in protecting the latter privacy right -- the right not to have 
intimate facts concerning one's life disclosed without one's 
consent. That right is a venerable one whose constitutional 
significance we have recognized in the past. See Paul P., 
170 F.3d at 401-02 (collecting cases). We also have no 
doubt that the prohibition on using or disclosing the 
contents of an illegally intercepted communication serves 
that interest by deterring the publicization of private facts. 
 
We are less certain, however, that the desire to protect 
the privacy interest that inheres in private facts is a 
content-neutral justification for restricting speech. The 
Supreme Court has instructed that "[l]isteners' reaction to 
speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation." 
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 
(1992); accord Lind v. Grimmer, 30 F.3d 115, 117 (9th Cir. 
1994) ("Because the[ ] concerns [addressed by the statute] 
all stem from the direct communicative impact of speech, 
we conclude that section 11-216(d) regulates speech on the 
basis of its content.") As Justice O'Connor explained in 
Boos, "[r]egulations that focus on the direct impact of 
speech on its audience" -- the speech's "primary effects" -- 
are not properly treated as content-neutral under Renton. 
485 U.S. at 321 (Opinion of O'Connor, J.). 
 
Although the defendants do not argue that the 
regulations at issue are content-based, there is a not 
implausible argument that the injury associated with the 
disclosure of private facts stems from the communicative 
impact of speech that contains those facts, i.e. having 
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others learn information about which one wishes they had 
remained ignorant. Thus, under the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence, the injury associated with such disclosure 
constitutes a "primary effect" of the disfavored speech, 
rather than a "secondary effect." This reasoning might 
suggest that a statute that regulated expression for the 
purpose of protecting the right not to have private facts 
disclosed without permission would be subject to strict 
scrutiny as a content-based regulation. 
 
We do not decide whether the Wiretapping Acts would 
indeed be properly categorized as content-based if justified 
on the basis of a need to prevent the disclosure of private 
facts because the United States for the most part eschews 
reliance on that justification in explaining the purpose of 
those acts. Instead, the United States argues that"the 
fundamental purpose of Title III is to maintain the 
confidentiality of wire, electronic, and oral 
communications." United States' Br. at 33. It reasons that 
"prohibiting the use of illegally intercepted communication 
. . . `strengthen[s] subsection (1)(a),' the provision that 
imposes the underlying ban on unauthorized interception, 
`by denying the wrongdoer the fruits of his labor' and by 
eliminating the demand for those fruits by third parties." 
United States' Br. at 33. We are satisfied that this latter 
justification does not rely on the communicative impact of 
speech and, therefore, that the Acts are properly treated as 
content-neutral. 
 
D. 
 
Accordingly, we adopt the government's position that we 
should apply intermediate scrutiny in our analysis of the 
issue before us. In doing so, we must first fix upon an 
acceptable definition of the term "intermediate scrutiny."4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In a recent article, the author uses the term" `intermediate scrutiny' 
to refer to a test that requires a state interest which is greater than 
legitimate but less than compelling and a fit between means and end 
that is not necessarily narrowly tailored but has more than just an 
incidental connection." Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: 
Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 298, 
300 n.15 (1998). 
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Intermediate scrutiny is used by the Court in a wide variety 
of cases calling for some balancing. Thus, intermediate 
scrutiny has been applied to statutes that discriminate on 
the basis of gender. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 
(1976) (holding that prohibiting sale of 3.2% beer to males 
under 21 and females under 18 did not "closely serve" goal 
of promoting traffic safety). It is the review standard used to 
examine whether an even-handed regulation promulgated 
for a legitimate public interest violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 
137, 142 (1970) (describing balancing test for state 
regulation); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 
325 U.S. 761 (1945) (invalidating limit on train length as 
not "plainly essential" to further state interest in safety). 
And in the First Amendment context, intermediate scrutiny 
has been applied to commercial speech cases, see Central 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980) (establishing four-part test for commercial 
speech regulation), and to examine the validity of time, 
place, and manner regulations, see United States v. Grace, 
461 U.S. 171 (1983) (invalidating statute prohibiting 
displaying flag, banner or device in Supreme Court building 
or on its grounds). 
 
Admittedly, the intermediate scrutiny test applied varies 
to some extent from context to context, and case to case. 
But it always encompasses some balancing of the state 
interest and the means used to effectuate that interest. And 
despite the frequent tendency to assume that regulations 
that are reviewed under less exacting scrutiny than strict 
scrutiny will be upheld, each of the cases referred to above 
as applying intermediate scrutiny held that the regulation 
in question was unconstitutional. The reasons varied. 
Sometimes, the Court held the asserted government 
interest insufficient to justify an expansive prohibition and 
noted the government failed to demonstrate that a lesser 
prohibition would not adequately serve its purpose. See, 
e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (holding 
that state interest in preventing littering did not justify ban 
on leafletting); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980) (invalidating 
prohibition on charitable solicitations for certain charities 
as too destructive of First Amendment interests). Other 
 
                                23 
  
times, the Court held the government failed to show that 
the challenged regulation substantially served the asserted 
government interest. See, e.g., Grace, 461 U.S. at 182. It 
should also be noted that in making the examination into 
whether the means chosen were those appropriate to the 
government interest, the Court has not always made a 
distinction between its analysis for purposes of 
intermediate scrutiny and for strict scrutiny. See, e.g., 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (invalidating 
candidate registration statute because voters' associational 
and voting rights outweighed state interest). 
 
The test usually applied in First Amendment cases to 
content-neutral regulation requires an examination of 
whether the regulation is "narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest" and "leave[s] open ample 
alternative channels for communication." Clark v. 
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 
(1984). There is a considerable number of First Amendment 
cases in which the Supreme Court, applying intermediate 
scrutiny, has found that the regulation at issue, albeit 
designed to advance legitimate state interests, failed to 
withstand that scrutiny. A review of illustrative cases 
provides some indication of the Court's analytic approach 
in such instances. 
 
In Schneider, the Court recognized that there is a 
legitimate government interest in preventing street littering 
but nevertheless found that "the purpose to keep the 
streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to 
justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on 
a public street from handing literature to one willing to 
receive it." 308 U.S. at 162. The Court termed the burden 
imposed on the cities in cleaning and caring for the streets 
"an indirect consequence of such distribution," and one 
that resulted from the "constitutional protection of the 
freedom of speech and press." Id. The Court continued, in 
language significant for this case, "[t]here are obvious 
methods of preventing littering. Amongst these is the 
punishment of those who actually throw papers on the 
streets." Id. (emphasis added). 
 
Similarly, in Village of Schaumburg, the Court recognized 
that the government had a substantial interest in 
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protecting the public from fraud, crime and undue 
annoyance, but held that the proffered interest, which the 
government sought to accomplish by an ordinance that 
prohibited the solicitation of contributions by charitable 
organizations that did not use at least 75% of their receipts 
for "charitable purposes," was "only peripherally promoted 
by the 75-percent requirement and could be sufficiently 
served by measures less destructive of First Amendment 
interests." 444 U.S. at 636. 
 
Both Schneider and Schaumburg were cited by the Court 
in a later case to illustrate "the delicate and difficult task 
[that] falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and 
to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in 
support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of[First 
Amendment] rights." Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 
452 U.S. 61, 70 (1981) (quoting Schneider, 308 U.S. at 
161). In Schad, the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance 
that excluded live entertainment, including nude dancing, 
throughout the borough after finding that the borough 
"ha[d] not adequately justified its substantial restriction of 
protected activity." Id. at 72. Justice Blackmun's concurring 
opinion makes clear that the burden to "articulate, and 
support, a reasoned and significant basis" for the 
governmental regulation should not be viewed as de 
minimis, even when the regulation is subjected to 
intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 77; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46, 52-53 
(1987) (describing intermediate scrutiny as a test that 
"takes seriously the inquiries into the substantiality of the 
governmental interest and the availability of less restrictive 
alternatives."). 
 
With the Supreme Court precedent as a guide, we 
examine whether the government has shown that its 
proffered interest is sufficiently furthered by application to 
these defendants of the damages provisions of the 
Wiretapping Acts to justify the impingement on the 
protected First Amendment interests at stake. 
 
As noted above, the United States contends that the 
Wiretapping Acts serve the government's interest in 
protecting privacy by helping "maintain the confidentiality 
of wire, electronic, and oral communications." United 
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States' Br. at 33. Undoubtedly, this is a significant state 
interest. We do not understand the defendants to deny that 
there is an important governmental interest served by the 
Wiretapping Acts. However, the government recognizes that 
not all of the provisions of the Wiretapping Acts are being 
challenged. In fact, only a portion of those Acts are at issue 
here -- the provisions imposing damages and counsel fees 
for the use and disclosure of intercepted material on those 
who played no part in the interception. 
 
The United States asserts that these provisions protect 
the confidentiality of communications in two ways: (1) "by 
denying the wrongdoer the fruits of his labor" and (2) "by 
eliminating the demand for those fruits by third parties." 
United States' Br. at 33. In this case, however, there is no 
question of "denying the wrongdoer the fruits of his labor." 
The record is devoid of any allegation that the defendants 
encouraged or participated in the interception in a way that 
would justify characterizing them as "wrongdoers." Thus, 
the application of these provisions to penalize an individual 
or radio stations who did participate in the interception and 
thereafter disclosed the intercepted material is not before 
us. 
 
We therefore focus on the United States' second 
contention -- that the provisions promote privacy by 
eliminating the demand for intercepted materials on the 
part of third parties. The connection between prohibiting 
third parties from using or disclosing intercepted material 
and preventing the initial interception is indirect at best. 
The United States has offered nothing other than its ipse 
dixit in support of its suggestion that imposing the 
substantial statutory damages provided by the Acts on 
Yocum or the media defendants will have any effect on the 
unknown party who intercepted the Bartnicki-Kane 
conversation. Nor has the United States offered any basis 
for us to conclude that these provisions have deterred any 
other would-be interceptors.5 Given the indirectness of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As the Supreme Court recently emphasized in invalidating a 
prohibition on the receipt of honoraria by government employees, "[w]hen 
the government defends a regulation on speech . . . it must do more 
than simply `posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured.' . . . 
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manner in which the United States claims the provisions 
serve its interest, we are not prepared to accept the United 
States' unsupported allegation that the statute is likely to 
produce the hypothesized effect. See Landmark 
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841 (1978) 
("The Commonwealth has offered little more than assertion 
and conjecture to support its claim that without criminal 
sanctions the objectives of the statutory scheme would be 
seriously undermined."). Faced with nothing "more than 
assertion and conjecture," it would be a long stretch indeed 
to conclude that the imposition of damages on defendants 
who were unconnected with the interception even 
"peripherally promoted" the effort to deter interception. See 
Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636. 
 
When the state seeks to effectuate legitimate state 
interests, 
 
       it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed 
       to serve those interests without unnecessarily 
       interfering with First Amendment freedoms. Hynes v. 
       Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. at 620; First National Bank 
       of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)."Broad 
       prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are 
       suspect. Precision of regulation must be the 
       touchstone. . . ." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 
       (1963) (citations omitted). 
 
Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637. 
 
In Village of Schaumburg, the Court stated that the 
Village's legitimate interest in preventing fraud could be 
better served by requiring solicitors to inform the public of 
the uses made of their contributions, than by prohibiting 
solicitation. Id. Similarly, in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 
141, 147-48 (1943), the Court held that in lieu of a 
complete prohibition of door-to-door solicitation, with its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely 
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in 
a 
direct and material way." United States v. National Treasury Employees 
Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) (citation and internal quotation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 
                                27 
  
draconian impact on First Amendment values, the City 
could have used the less restrictive means of punishing 
those who trespass "in defiance of the previously expressed 
will of the occupant." Indeed, the Wiretapping Acts already 
provide for punishment of the offender, i.e., the individual 
who intercepted the wire communication and who used or 
disclosed it. See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162 (city should 
prevent littering by punishing litterers, not by prohibiting 
leafleting). Those who indirectly participated in the 
interception, either by aiding or abetting, would also fall 
within the sanctions provided by the statute. Therefore, the 
government's desired effect can be reached by enforcement 
of existing provisions against the responsible parties rather 
than by imposing damages on these defendants. 
 
We are also concerned that the provisions will deter 
significantly more speech than is necessary to serve the 
government's asserted interest. It is likely that in many 
instances these provisions will deter the media from 
publishing even material that may lawfully be disclosed 
under the Wiretapping Acts. 
 
Reporters often will not know the precise origins of 
information they receive from witnesses and other sources, 
nor whether the information stems from a lawful source. 
Moreover, defendants argue that they cannot be held liable 
for use and publication of information that had previously 
been disclosed. Assuming this is so, reporters may have 
difficulty discerning whether material they are considering 
publishing has previously been disclosed to the public. 
Such uncertainty could lead a cautious reporter not to 
disclose information of public concern for fear of violating 
the Wiretapping Acts. 
 
Bartnicki and Kane recognize that the Supreme Court 
has frequently expressed concern about the "timidity and 
self-censorship" that may result from permitting the media 
to be punished for publishing certain truthful information. 
See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535; Cox Broadcasting, 
420 U.S. at 496. The public interest and newsworthiness of 
the conversation broadcast and disclosed by the defendants 
are patent. In the conversation, the president of a union 
engaged in spirited negotiations with the School Board 
suggested "blow[ing] off [the] front porches" of the School 
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Board members. Nothing in the context suggests that this 
was said in anything other than a serious vein. Certainly, 
even if no later acts were taken to follow through on the 
statement, and hence no crime committed, the fact that the 
president of the school teachers' union would countenance 
the suggestion is highly newsworthy and of public 
significance. Our concerns are only heightened by the 
Supreme Court's admonition in Smith that"state action to 
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can 
satisfy constitutional standards." 443 U.S. at 102. 
 
Our dissenting colleague does not disagree with any of 
the applicable legal principles. He candidly states that the 
difference between us is one of "ultimate application of [the 
agreed upon] analysis to the case at bar." Dissenting Op. at 
36. Therefore, we add only a few brief comments pertaining 
to that application. 
 
Evidently, one of the principal differences between our 
respective applications lies in the weight we give the factors 
to be balanced. The dissent suggests the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Schneider, Struthers, and Schaumburg are not 
pertinent to this case because the state interests in those 
cases (littered streets, annoying door-to-door proselytizers,6 
and fraudulent charitable solicitors, respectively) were "not 
very important." The dissent contrasts those interests with 
the significant governmental interest at issue here -- that 
of maintaining the confidentiality of wire, electronic, and 
oral communications. 
 
Presumably, the dissent's point is that we must weigh 
more heavily the privacy interests furthered by the 
Wiretapping Acts than the Court weighed the state interests 
in the three cited cases. Given the conceded importance of 
privacy and confidentiality at issue here, we nonetheless 
find it difficult to accord it more weight than the interests 
in preventing disclosure of the name of a rape victim, the 
identity of a judge in a putative disciplinary proceeding, or 
the identity of a youth charged as a juvenile offender at 
issue in Cox Broadcasting, Landmark Communications and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The dissent fails to mention that one of the purposes for the ordinance 
referred to by the Court in Struthers was crime prevention. See 319 U.S. 
at 144-45. 
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Smith, respectively. Yet when faced with each of those 
circumstances, the Supreme Court determined that despite 
the strong privacy interest underlying the statutory and 
state constitutional provisions punishing disclosure of such 
information, the interests served by the First Amendment 
must take precedence.7 It would be difficult to hold that 
privacy of telephone conversations are more "important" 
than the privacy interests the states unsuccessfully 
championed in those cases. 
 
In addition, we do not share the dissent's confidence that 
imposition of civil liability on those who neither participated 
in nor encouraged the interception is an effective deterrent 
to such interception. The dissent finds such a nexus in the 
legislative landscape, where half of the states that prohibit 
wiretapping also authorize civil damage actions. With due 
respect, we find this a slim reed, not only because it 
appears from the dissent's statistics that the other half of 
the states with wiretapping statutes have not included a 
damage provision but because the incidence of state 
statutes, and hence "widespread legislative consensus," 
does not prove the deterrent effect of the prohibition. 
Indeed, there is not even general agreement as to the 
deterrent effect of a criminal statute on the perpetrator,8 
much less on those who were not in league with the 
perpetrator. In determining whether a regulation that 
restricts First Amendment rights "substantially serves [its 
asserted] purposes," see Grace, 461 U.S. at 182, the Court 
has never found that question satisfied by sheer numbers 
of state statutes. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Although we acknowledge that those decisions arose from a stricter 
level of scrutiny than we employ here and somewhat different 
circumstances, the fact remains that the Court has generally tilted for 
the First Amendment in the tension between press freedom and privacy 
rights. This is bemoaned by the dissenting Justices in The Florida Star, 
who state candidly they "would strike the balance rather differently." 491 
U.S. at 552 (White, J., dissenting). So, apparently, would the dissent in 
this case. 
 
8. The opposing views of deterrence were noted in connection with 
capital punishment in Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 395-96 (1972). 
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The dissent engages in hyperbole when it suggests that 
our decision "invalidates a portion of the federal statute" 
and "by necessary implication spells the demise of a portion 
of more than twenty other state statutes." Dissenting Op. at 
42. The statutes, which are designed to prohibit and 
punish wiretapping, remain unimpaired. All that is at issue 
is the application of those statutes to punish members of 
the media who neither encouraged nor participated directly 
or indirectly in the interception, an application rarely 
attempted. 
 
Moreover, we do not agree that the recent decision in 
Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), 
presented that court with the same issue presented here. 
Most particularly, in Boehner, where a divided court upheld 
the constitutionality of S 2511(1)(c), all three judges 
emphasized in their separate opinions that there was no 
effort to impose civil damages on the newspapers (The New 
York Times, et al.) which had printed the details of a 
conversation that been illegally intercepted. Thus, for 
example, in the lead opinion the court stated at the outset, 
"[n]or should we be concerned with whetherS 2511(1)(c) 
would be constitutional as applied to the newspapers who 
published the initial stories about the illegally-intercepted 
conference call." Id. at 467. Liability in that case was 
sought to be imposed on James McDermott, a congressman 
who caused a copy of the tape to be given to the 
newspapers. Although technically, defendant Yocum in our 
case stands in the same position as McDermott, i.e. as the 
source but not the interceptor, there is an indication in 
Boehner that McDermott was more than merely an innocent 
conduit. Indeed, McDermott, unlike Yocum, knew who 
intercepted the conversation because he "accepted" the tape 
from the interceptors and, the opinion suggests, not only 
sought to embarrass his political opponents with the tape 
but also promised the interceptors immunity for their illegal 
conduct. Id. at 475-76. In fact, the second judge, who 
concurred in the judgment and in only a portion of the 
opinion for the court, specifically limited his concurrence to 
the decision that S 2511(1)(c) "is not unconstitutional as 
applied in this case," id. at 478 (emphasis added), and 
pointed out that "McDermott knew the transaction was 
illegal at the time he entered into it," id.  at 479. In contrast, 
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Yocum has not been shown to have "entered into" any 
transaction with the interceptors. In the posture of this 
case, all parties accept his allegation that the tape was left 
in his mailbox. 
 
The Boehner court was acutely aware that no court has 
yet held that the government may punish the press through 
imposition of damages merely for publishing information of 
public significance because its original source acquired that 
information in violation of a federal or state statute. Cf. 
Landmark, 435 U.S. at 837 (finding it unnecessary to adopt 
categorical approach). As noted earlier in this opinion, the 
Supreme Court has been asked to permit a state to penalize 
the publication of truthful information in at least four 
instances. In three of the four cases, the statutes at issue 
protected the privacy interests of such vulnerable 
individuals as juveniles and the victims of sexual assault. 
See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 526; Smith, 443 U.S. at 98; 
Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 472. In the remaining case, 
the statute at issue was meant to protect the state's 
interest in an independent and ethical judiciary. See 
Landmark, 435 U.S. at 830. Despite the strength of the 
state interests asserted, the Supreme Court in each case 
concluded that those interests were insufficient to justify 
the burdens imposed on First Amendment freedoms. 
 
We likewise conclude that the government's significant 
interest in protecting privacy is not sufficient to justify the 
serious burdens the damages provisions of the Wiretapping 
Acts place on free speech. We are skeptical that the burden 
these provisions place on speech will serve to advance the 
government's goals. Even assuming the provisions might 
advance these interests, the practical impact on speech is 
likely to be "substantially broader than necessary." Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989). 
 
We therefore hold that the Wiretapping Acts fail the test 
of intermediate scrutiny and may not constitutionally be 
applied to penalize the use or disclosure of illegally 
intercepted information where there is no allegation that 
the defendants participated in or encouraged that 
interception. It follows that we need not decide whether 
these provisions leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of information. 
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III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will reverse the order of the 
District Court denying summary judgment to the 
defendants, and will remand with directions to grant that 
motion. 
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POLLAK, District Judge, dissenting. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
has recently determined, in Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 
463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), that the First Amendment does not 
bar a civil damage action brought, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 2511(1)(c) and 18 U.S.C. S 2520(a), and pursuant to the 
Florida statutory provisions that are counterparts of the 
federal statute, against one who, so the plaintiff alleged, 
gave to the New York Times and other newspapers copies of 
a tape recording of a telephone conversation which the 
defendant had "knowledge and reason to know" had been 
unlawfully intercepted.1 Today this court holds that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In Boehner v. McDermott, the plaintiff, John Boehner, is a Republican 
Representative who, together with other members of the Republican 
leadership of the House of Representatives (including then Speaker 
Gingrich), was in 1996 party to a conference telephone call that was 
unlawfully intercepted by persons equipped with a radio scanner. 
According to Representative Boehner's complaint, the interceptors turned 
over the tape to James A. McDermott, a Democratic Representative who 
was at the time the ranking minority member of the House Ethics 
Committee; Representative McDermott in turn gave copies of the tape to 
the New York Times and other newspapers; and the New York Times 
promptly published part of the taped conversation. Representative 
Boehner sued Representative McDermott, but did not sue the New York 
Times or any other newspaper. The district court dismissed 
Representative Boehner's complaint on First Amendment grounds. The 
circuit court reversed. 
 
The circuit court perceived a potentially important distinction between 
Representative McDermott's First Amendment claim and the First 
Amendment claim that might have been made by the New York Times or 
another newspaper, if a newspaper had been named as a defendant. 
Identifying that potential distinction, the court was at pains to confine 
its analysis to Representative McDermott's claim: 
 
       McDermott's liability under S 2511(1)(c) rests on the truth of two 
       allegations: that he "caused a copy of the tape" to be given to the 
       newspapers; and that he "did so intentionally and with knowledge 
       and reason to know that the recorded phone conversation had been 
       illegally intercepted (as the cover letter on its face disclosed)." 
       Complaint P 20. Although the circumstances of McDermott's 
       transactions with the newspapers, including who said what to 
       whom, may become evidence at trial, it is his conduct in delivering 
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First Amendment does bar a civil damage action brought, 
pursuant to the Federal statute and its Pennsylvania 
counterpart, against (1) one who handed over a copy of a 
taped telephone conversation to a radio reporter, and (2) 
the radio reporter and the two radio stations that 
subsequently broadcast the tape, plaintiffs having alleged 
that both the person who handed over the tape and the 
radio reporter had, in the statutory language, "reason to 
know" that the taped conversation had been intercepted in 
contravention of the federal and Pennsylvania statutes. In 
the case decided today the court addresses a broader range 
of issues then those presented in Boehner v. McDermott: in 
Boehner v. McDermott the only defendant was the person 
who allegedly delivered to the media a copy of a tape of an 
allegedly wrongfully intercepted telephone conversation; in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       the tape that gives rise to his potential liability under S 
2511(1)(c). 
       McDermott's behavior in turning over the tapes doubtless conveyed 
       a message, expressing something about him. All behavior does. But 
       not all behavior comes within the First Amendment. 
 
       "[E]ven on the assumption that there was[some] communicative 
       element in" McDermott's conduct, the Supreme Court has held that 
       "when `speech' and `nonspeech' elements are combined in the same 
       course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest 
in 
       regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations 
       on First Amendment freedoms." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 
       367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). The O'Brien 
       framework is the proper mode of First Amendment analysis in this 
       case. McDermott's challenge is only to the statute as it applies to 
his 
       delivery of the tape to newspapers. Whether a different analysis 
       would govern if, for instance, McDermott violatedS 2511(1)(c) by 
       reading a transcript of the tape in a news conference, is therefore 
a 
       question not presented here. Nor should we be concerned with 
       whether S 2511(1)(c) would be constitutional as applied to the 
       newspapers who published the initial stories about the illegally- 
       intercepted conference call. The focus must be on McDermott's 
       activity and on his activity alone. 
 
191 F.3d at 467. 
 
The author of the court's opinion was Judge Randolph. Judge 
Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, joining part (including the 
paragraphs just quoted) of Judge Randolph's opinion. Judge Santelle 
filed a dissenting opinion. 
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today's case there are three "media defendants" in addition 
to the defendant who allegedly delivered to the media a 
copy of a tape of an allegedly wrongfully intercepted 
telephone conversation.2 
 
I am in general agreement with the careful analytic path 
traced by the court through the minefield of First 
Amendment precedents. However, I find myself in 
disagreement with the court's ultimate application of its 
analysis to the case at bar. 
 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Boehner v. McDermott court was at pains to point out the limited 
scope of its ruling. See note 1, supra . See also note 3, infra. 
 
3. Although I have expressed general agreement with the court's analytic 
approach. I should note one aspect of the analysis on which I differ with 
the court. That aspect is cogently illustrated by the distinction the 
Boehner v. McDermott court drew between the First Amendment posture 
of Representative McDermott and the potential First Amendment posture 
of a newspaper that published (as the New York Times in fact did) a 
portion of the intercepted telephone conference call, had such a 
newspaper been sued. As the Boehner v. McDermott  excerpt quoted in 
footnote 1, supra, makes clear, the court was doubtful that 
Representative McDermott's action in giving copies of the tape to 
newspapers was itself "speech" in the full First Amendment sense. Judge 
Randolph, speaking for the court, saw Representative McDermott's First 
Amendment claim as cabined by the Supreme Court's holding in United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), that "when `speech' and 
`nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a 
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech 
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." 
 
In the case at bar, in which the plaintiffs have sued both Yocum and 
media defendants, the United States argues that the approach reflected 
in O'Brien and cases that follow it is appropriate to the entire case. The 
court rejects that view. I find the Boehner v. McDermott exposition of 
Representative McDermott's limited First Amendment posture 
persuasive, and thus in the case at bar I would apply the O'Brien 
approach to defendant Yocum -- whose role, from a First Amendment 
perspective, seems analogous to that of Representative McDermott -- 
while rejecting O'Brien as the proper approach to the First Amendment 
claims of the media defendants. However, the distinction is not one that 
I need pursue, because, accepting for the purposes of the case at bar the 
court's comprehensive rejection of O'Brien, I nonetheless wind up 
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I. 
 
I agree with the court's statement of the case. And I agree 
with the court's determination that the challenged federal 
and Pennsylvania wiretapping statutes -- here invoked by 
plaintiffs seeking damages for defendants' alleged 
disclosure and use of a taped telephone conversation of 
plaintiffs that defendants allegedly had "reason to know" 
was the product of a prohibited "interception of a wire . . . 
communication," 18 U.S.C. S 2511(c); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 5703(2) -- are "content neutral." I further agree with the 
court that the proper standard to be applied in testing the 
constitutionality of the federal and Pennsylvania statutes as 
here applied is "intermediate scrutiny." Finally, I agree with 
the court that intermediate scrutiny "always encompasses 
some balancing of the state interest and the means used to 
effectuate that interest." Slip Op., p. 23. Concretely, such 
scrutiny calls for judicial assessment of whether the 
challenged regulation is "narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest." Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 4 
 
Where I part company with the court is in its application 
of intermediate scrutiny in this case. 
 
A. 
 
The court begins by acknowledging what I take to be 
beyond dispute: namely, that the professed governmental 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
disagreeing with the court on how the court's analytic approach plays 
out as applied, with the result that I conclude that liability in damages 
could constitutionally have been imposed both on Yocum and on the 
media defendants if the plaintiffs had been permitted to take their case 
to trial and had proved their allegations to the satisfaction of the fact- 
finder. 
 
4. The other criterion identified in Clark v. Community for Creative Non- 
Violence -- namely, whether the challenged regulation "leave[s] open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the information" 468 
U.S. at 293 -- is not pertinent to the case at bar because the challenged 
statutes are not, as the challenged regulations in Clark v. Community for 
Creative Non-Violence were deemed to be, "time, place or manner 
restrictions." Ibid. And see id. at 295. 
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interest -- the interest of the United States (which is 
presumably also Pennsylvania's interest) in "maintain[ing] 
the confidentiality of wire, electronic, and oral 
communications," Brief for the United States, p. 33 -- is "a 
significant state interest." Slip Op., supra, p. 26. Then -- 
evidently with a view to exploring whether the challenged 
prohibition on disclosure or use of a conversation by one 
who had "reason to know" that the conversation was 
intercepted unlawfully is "narrowly tailored to serve [that] 
significant governmental interest" -- the court undertakes 
to "focus on the United States' . . . contention . . . that the 
provisions promote privacy by eliminating the demand for 
intercepted materials on the part of third parties." Slip Op., 
p. 26. The court then proceeds as follows: 
 
       The connection between prohibiting third parties from 
       using or disclosing intercepted material and preventing 
       the initial interception is indirect at best. The United 
       States has offered nothing other than its ipse dixit in 
       support of its suggestion that imposing the substantial 
       statutory damages provided by the Acts on Yocum or 
       the media defendants will have any effect on the 
       unknown party who intercepted the Bartnicki-Kane 
       conversation. Nor has the United States offered any 
       basis for us to conclude that these provisions have 
       deterred any other would-be interceptors. Given the 
       indirectness of the manner in which the United States 
       claims the provisions serve its interest, we are not 
       prepared to accept the United States' unsupported 
       allegation that the statute actually produces the 
       hypothesized effect. See Landmark Communications, 
       Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841 (1978) ("The 
       Commonwealth has offered little more than assertion 
       and conjecture to support its claim that without 
       criminal sanctions the objectives of the statutory 
       scheme would be seriously undermined."). Faced with 
       nothing "more than assertion and conjecture," it would 
       be a long stretch indeed to conclude that the 
       imposition of damages on defendants who were 
       unconnected with the interception even "peripherally 
       promoted" the effort to deter interception. See Village of 
       Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636. 
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        When the state seeks to effectuate legitimate state 
       interests, 
 
       it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations 
       designed to serve those interests without 
       unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment 
       freedoms. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. at 
       620; First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , 435 
       U.S. 765, 786 (1978). "Broad prophylactic rules in 
       the area of free expression are suspect. Precision of 
       regulation must be the touchstone. . . ." NAACP v. 
       Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (citations omitted). 
 
       Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637. 
 
        In Village of Schaumburg, the Court stated that the 
       Village's legitimate interest in preventing fraud could 
       be better served by requiring solicitors to inform the 
       public of the uses made of their contributions, than by 
       prohibiting solicitation. Id. Similarly, in Martin v. 
       Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147-48 (1943), the Court held 
       that in lieu of a complete prohibition of door-to-door 
       solicitation, with its draconian impact on First 
       Amendment values, the City could have used the less 
       restrictive means of punishing those who trespass"in 
       defiance of the previously expressed will of the 
       occupant." Indeed, the Wiretapping Acts already 
       provide for punishment of the offender, i.e., the 
       individual who intercepted the wire communication 
       and who used or disclosed it. See Schneider, 308 U.S. 
       at 162 (city should prevent littering by punishing 
       litterers, not by prohibiting leafleting). Those who 
       indirectly participated in the interception, either by 
       aiding or abetting, would also fall within the sanctions 
       provided by the statute. Therefore, the government's 
       desired effect can be reached by enforcement of 
       existing provisions against the responsible parties 
       rather than by imposing damages on these defendants. 
 
Slip Op. p. 26-28. 
 
With all respect, I find this portion of the court's opinion 
unpersuasive: 
 
First: I take issue with the proposition that "[t]he 
connection between prohibiting third parties from using or 
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disclosing intercepted material and preventing the initial 
interception is indirect at best." "[P]reventing the initial 
interception" is only part of the statutory scheme. The 
statutory purposes, as the court has noted, are"(1) 
protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications, 
and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances 
and conditions under which the interception of wire and 
oral communications may be authorized." S. Rep. No. 90- 
1079 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153. 
Unauthorized interception of a communication is prohibited 
-- and made both a criminal offense and an event giving 
rise to civil liability -- both to protect parties to a 
communication from an initial trespass on their privacy 
and to protect them from subsequent disclosure (and/or 
other detrimental use). "Unless disclosure is prohibited, 
there will be an incentive for illegal interceptions; and 
unless disclosure is prohibited, the damage caused by an 
illegal interception will be compounded. It is not enough to 
prohibit disclosure only by those who conduct the unlawful 
eavesdropping. One would not expect them to reveal 
publicly the contents of the communication; if they did so 
they would risk incriminating themselves. It was therefore 
`essential' for Congress to impose upon third parties, that 
is, upon those not responsible for the interception, a duty 
of non-disclosure." Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d at 470. 
 
Second: Given the close nexus between the legislative 
prohibition on unauthorized interception and the legislative 
imposition upon "third parties, that is, upon those not 
responsible for the interception, [of] a duty of non- 
disclosure," I am puzzled by the court's view that the 
argument presented by the United States in support of the 
statutory regime of civil liability lacks persuasiveness 
because it is not supported by a demonstration that 
"imposing the substantial statutory damages provided by 
the Acts on Yocum or the media defendants will have any 
effect on the unknown party who intercepted the Bartnicki- 
Kane conversation," or "that these [statutory] provisions 
have deterred any other would-be interceptors." Nor do I 
think the court's view is buttressed by the court's 
invocation of Landmark Communication, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 
U.S. 829 (1978). It is true that in Landmark, in which the 
Supreme Court struck down, as applied to a newspaper, a 
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statute making it a misdemeanor to "divulge information" 
about confidential proceedings conducted by Virginia's 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, the Court 
observed that "[t]he Commonwealth has offered little more 
than assertion and conjecture to support its claim that 
without criminal sanctions the objectives of the statutory 
scheme [which contemplated a process of confidential 
inquiry into alleged judicial misconduct] would be seriously 
undermined." But the special -- and limited-- pertinence 
of the Court's observation becomes clear when it is read in 
context. The full paragraph follows: 
 
        It can be assumed for purposes of decision that 
       confidentiality of Commission proceedings serves 
       legitimate state interests. The question, however, is 
       whether these interests are sufficient to justify the 
       encroachment on First Amendment guarantees which 
       the imposition of criminal sanctions entails with 
       respect to nonparticipants such as Landmark. The 
       Commonwealth has offered little more than assertion 
       and conjecture to support its claim that without 
       criminal sanctions the objectives of the statutory 
       scheme would be seriously undermined. While not 
       dispositive, we note that more than 40 States having 
       similar commissions have not found it necessary to 
       enforce confidentiality by use of criminal sanctions 
       against nonparticipants. 
 
435 U.S. at 841. In striking contrast is the legislative 
landscape that forms the setting of the case at bar. 
Complementing the federal statute are more than forty 
state wiretapping statutes. Of these state statutes, 
approximately half have provisions which, like the federal 
statute, (1) prohibit disclosure or use of an intercepted 
conversation by one who knows or has "reason to know" 
that the interception was unlawful, and (2) authorize civil 
damage actions against one who discloses or uses such 
unlawful interception. As this case illustrates, Pennsylvania 
is one of those states. So are Delaware and New Jersey -- 
Pennsylvania's Third Circuit siblings. See 11 Del. Code 
Ann., S 1336 (1996); N.J. Stat. Ann. #8E8E # 2A-156 A-3, 2A-156- 
A24 (West 1985 & Supp. 1999). Listed in footnote 5 are the 
other state statutes that closely parallel the provisions of 
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the federal and Pennsylvania legislation challenged by 
defendants in the case at bar.5 
 
In short, there appears to be a widespread legislative 
consensus that the imposition of civil liability on persons 
engaged in conduct of the kind attributed to these 
defendants is an important ingredient of a regime designed 
to protect the privacy of private conversations. Moreover, 
the decision announced today not only invalidates a portion 
of the federal statute and the counterpart portion of the 
Pennsylvania statute, it by necessary implication spells the 
demise of a portion of more than twenty other state 
statutes (and also of a statute of the District of Columbia); 
in the two centuries of American constitutional law I cannot 
recall any prior decision, whether of a federal court or of a 
state court, which, in the exercise of the awesome power of 
judicial review, has cut so wide a swath. 
 
Third: What has been said points up the non-pertinence 
to the case at bar of Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 
(1939), Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), and Village 
of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 
U.S. 620 (1980), cases cited by the court as illustrative of 
the proposition that regulations designed to promote 
significant governmental interests should not sweep so 
broadly as to impose unnecessary constraints on First 
Amendment rights of free expression and communication. 
The constitutional shortcomings in Schneider (combating 
the littering of streets by curbing leafleting), Struthers 
(banning door-to-door distribution of circulars, including 
religious literature, in order to protect homeowners from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Fla. Stat. Ann. SS 934.03, 812.15; Haw. Rev. Stat. SS 803-42(a)(3), 
803-48; Idaho Code SS 18-6702, 18-6709; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
5/14-2, 5/14-6; Iowa Code SS 808B.2(1)(c), 808B.8; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
SS 15:1303A(3), 15:1312; Md. Code Ann. S 10-402(a)(2), 10-410; Mich. 
Comp. Laws Ann. SS 750.539e, 750.539h; Minn. Stat. Ann. 
SS 626A.02(c), 626A.13; Neb. Rev. Stat. SS 86-702, 86-702.02; N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. SS 570-A:2, 570-A:11; N.C. Gen. Stat. SS 15A-287, 15A-296; 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. SS 2933.52, 2933.65; Tenn. Code Ann. SS 39-13- 
601, 39-13-603; Utah Code Ann. SS 77-23a-4, 77-23a-11; Va. Code Ann. 
SS 19.2-62, 19.2-69; W. Va. Code SS 62-1D-3, 62-1D-12; Wis. Stat. 
S 968.31; Wyo. Stat. Ann. SS 7-3-602, 7-3-609; See also D.C. Code Ann. 
SS 23-542, 23-554. 
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annoyance), and Village of Schaumburg (combating allegedly 
fraudulent charitable solicitation by banning all solicitation 
by groups not disbursing 75% of receipts) involved 
situations in which small towns imposed on traditional 
First Amendment activities pervasive constraints sought to 
be justified as ways of dealing with distinct (and not very 
important) problems that could have been more effectively 
addressed by governmental action directed at the actual 
problems - e.g., prosecuting litterers (Schneider); 
prosecuting as trespassers solicitors who do not depart 
when requested by homeowners to do so (Struthers ); 
requiring organizations soliciting contributions to disclose 
how receipts are used (Village of Schaumburg). In the case 
at bar, unauthorized disclosure (or other use) of private 
conversations is a central aspect of the very evil the 
challenged statutory provisions are designed to combat. 
 
B. 
 
The court also notes that "[r]eporters often will not know 
the precise origins of information they receive from 
witnesses and other sources, nor whether the information 
stems from a lawful source," or, indeed, "whether material 
they are considering publishing has previously been 
disclosed to the public." Slip Op., p. 28, As a result, the 
court opines, "[i]t is likely that in many instances these 
[challenged statutory] provisions will deter the media from 
publishing even material that may lawfully be disclosed 
under the Wiretapping Acts." Ibid. 
 
I think the court overstates the potential problems of the 
media. One would suppose that a responsible journalist -- 
whether press or broadcast -- would be unlikely to propose 
publication of a transcript of an apparently newsworthy 
conversation without some effort to insure that the 
conversation in fact took place and to authenticate the 
identities of the parties to the conversation. As part of such 
an inquiry, the question whether the parties to the 
conversation had authorized its recording and release, or 
whether others had lawfully intercepted the conversation, 
would seem naturally to arise. Moreover, current technology 
would make it relatively easy to determine whether the 
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conversation had been the subject of a prior press or 
broadcast report.6 
 
In my judgment, a more substantial First Amendment 
difficulty is posed by the fact that the person or entity 
charged with knowing or having "reason to know" that a 
published conversation was unlawfully intercepted is called 
on to contest before a judicial fact-finder (whether jury or 
judge) a plaintiff 's allegation of knowledge or"reason to 
know." But the difficulties attendant on fact-finder 
oversight of journalistic practice (or, indeed, of public 
disclosure by non-journalists) can, I believe, be met by 
adoption of the procedural proposals advanced in the brief 
for the United States: 
 
        In criminal prosecutions under Title III, scienter must 
       be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In civil cases 
       scienter ordinarily would be subject to a conventional 
       preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. When a claim 
       is brought for disclosure of information about matters 
       of public significance by persons who were not involved 
       in the illegal interception, however, a preponderance- 
       of-the-evidence standard may operate to deter the 
       publication of information that was not the product of 
       illegal surveillance. To avoid that result, it might prove 
       appropriate for district courts to impose a higher 
       standard of proof of scienter in such cases, such as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. On occasion, inquiry of the kind suggested might indeed take a few 
days. But news reporting -- especially with respect to events (such as a 
conversation) that are concluded, rather than still evolving -- need not 
be an instant process. In the case at bar, it appears that defendant 
Vopper did not broadcast the conversation until some months after 
defendant Yocum gave him a copy of the tape. Deposition of Frederick W. 
Vopper, App. 60a-61a. On the other hand, the New York Times 
published a portion of the intercepted conversation that gave rise to 
Boehner v. McDermott the day after it received the tape. The New York 
Times story also reported that the tape had been"made . . . available to 
the New York Times" by "a Democratic Congressman hostile to Mr. 
Gingrich who insisted that he not be identified further" and who told the 
Times that the tape had been given to him [on January 8, 1997] by a 
couple who said the tape "had been recorded [on December 21, 1996] off 
a radio scanner, suggesting that one participant was using a cellular 
telephone." N.Y. Times, January 10, 1997, p.1, col.3. 
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       proof by "clear and convincing" evidence, and for 
       appellate courts to conduct independent review of the 
       findings of the trier of fact. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
       Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (requiring clear and 
       convincing evidence of "actual malice" in defamation 
       cases); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 
       Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 498-511 (1984) (de novo  appellate 
       review of findings regarding actual malice). See 
       generally Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669-71 
       (1994) (plurality opinion) (discussing circumstances in 
       which First Amendment requires modifications of 
       burdens of proof and other procedural rules). 
 
Brief for the United States, pp. 40-41 n. 8.7 
 
II. 
 
As the court's opinion makes plain, the First Amendment 
values of free speech and press are among the values most 
cherished in the American social order. Maintenance of 
these values (and the other values of the Bill of Rights) 
against overreaching by the legislature or the executive is 
among the judiciary's major and most demanding 
responsibilities. In the case at bar, however, the First 
Amendment values on which defendants take their stand 
are countered by privacy values sought to be advanced by 
Congress and the Pennsylvania General Assembly that are 
of comparable - indeed kindred - dimension. Three decades 
ago the late Chief Judge Fuld of the New York Court of 
Appeals put the matter well in Estate of Hemingway v. 
Random House, 23 N.Y. 2d 341, 348, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 
(1968) (in words that the Supreme Court has quoted with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The court's decision has the anomalous consequence of cloaking 
Yocum, who is not a "media defendant", with the First Amendment 
protections the court deems appropriate for radio reporter Vopper and 
the two radio stations. I have undertaken to explain in footnote 3, supra, 
that in my judgment Yocum has a far more tenuous First Amendment 
claim (if any) than the media defendants. I do not think that, merely by 
virtue of the fortuity that the plaintiffs have elected to sue Yocum and 
the media defendants (which the plaintiff in Boehner v. McDermott did 
not do), Yocum becomes a third-party beneficiary of whatever First 
Amendment protections may accrue to the media defendants. 
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approval, Harper & Row Publishers v. National Enterprises, 
471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)): 
 
       The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to 
       prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public 
       expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to 
       speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet. 
       There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, 
       a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one 
       which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of 
       speech in its affirmative aspect. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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